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The offshore jurisdiction of the Australian states 
Stuart Kaye* 
Abstract 
Australian offshore jurisdiction is among the most complex in the world, not least in part because of the 
division in jurisdiction between the Commonwealth Government in Canberra, and the Australian state 
governments. State jurisdiction is increasingly important in Australia, with increases in maritime capabilities 
for state police forces, the proliferation of state marine parks as part of the suite of national parks and the 
relevance of state jurisdiction to native title. This article provides an introduction to the determination of 
maritime jurisdiction vested in the Australian states, an area of law generally poorly understood and seldom 
considered by publicists. 
______________________________________________ 
Introduction 
In order to understand the contemporary jurisdiction 
of the Australian states, there is a need for an 
understanding of the historical development of their 
jurisdiction, and to some extent, the jurisdiction of 
the Commonwealth Government. This is in part 
because the jurisdiction of the Australian states 
offshore has historically been very limited, and these 
limitations have flowed through into contemporary 
practice. For the most part, the states have been 
reluctant to apply their laws to their adjacent 
maritime areas, and understanding the reasons for 
this is important. 
Historical background 
Going back to the origins of the states as colonies 
within the British Empire, there was a dearth of 
colonial practice with regard to the law of the sea. 
The latter half of the 19th Century saw the growth of 
the doctrine of colonial extraterritorial legislative 
incompetence.1 This doctrine prevented colonial 
legislatures from making laws that applied beyond 
the limits of the colony, which included ocean areas. 
When combined with the English decision of R v 
Keyn (The Franconia)2 which indicated that the 
common law jurisdiction of the courts ended at the 
sea shore in the absence of legislation specifically 
extending jurisdiction offshore, the result was to 
                                                     
                                                     
* Professor of Law, Melbourne Law School, University of 
Melbourne. 
1 The doctrine reached what might be described as its ‘zenith’ 
in limiting the competency of colonial legislatures in 
MacLeod v Attorney-General (NSW) [1891] AC 455; see the 
discussion in D P O’Connell, ‘The Doctrine of Colonial 
Extra-territorial Incompetence’ (1959) 75 Law Quarterly 
Review 318 especially 323-327. 
2 (1876) 2 Ex D 63. 
severely limit the ability of the colonies to make 
laws for their offshore areas.3
The doctrine of colonial extraterritorial 
incompetence was formally removed for the 
Australian states with the Australia Act 1986 (Imp). 
This Act explicitly gave the states power to legislate 
with extraterritorial effect. However, while section 2 
of the Australia Act 1986 expressly states each state 
has the power to make law with extraterritorial 
operation, the High Court appears to have maintained 
the pre-Australia Act restriction of establishing a 
nexus between the state and the activity being 
regulated. The test for a sufficient connection has been 
liberally applied.4
Another reason for the virtual absence of national 
legislation relating to offshore areas through this 
period can be found in the Constitutional division of 
state and Commonwealth power in Australia. The 
Constitution does give the power to regulate both 
external affairs (s 51(xxix)) and fisheries beyond 
territorial limits (s 51(x)) to the Commonwealth.5 
However, prior to Federation and for many years 
afterward, it was believed that the former power had 
no application to fisheries, and that the latter 
3 This is discussed in D P O’Connell, ‘Problems of Australian 
Coastal Jurisdiction’ (1958) 35 British Yearbook of 
International Law 199, 226-229. 
4 Port Macdonnell Professional Fishermen’s Association Inc v 
South Australia (1989) 168 CLR 340; Union Steamship v 
King (1988) 166 CLR 1; see also Welker v Hewitt (1969) 120 
CLR 503; Millar v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1932) 48 
CLR 618; Pearce v Florenca (1976) 135 CLR 507 for 
background to the nexus test. 
5 The latter was the same power given to the Federal Council 
of Australasia: Federal Council of Australasia Act 1885 
(Imp) s 15(c). 
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pertained only to waters beyond the territorial sea.6 
It was believed that the state Parliaments had 
jurisdiction over the territorial sea.7 As such, the 
Commonwealth took little action in relation to 
offshore areas believing (erroneously, as the High 
Court was later to point out) that the extent of its 
powers were circumscribed by the constitutional 
arrangements for territorial waters, and international 
law for those waters beyond. 
The accommodation between the Commonwealth 
and states over offshore jurisdiction began to come 
under stress in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Two 
judges of the High Court in Bonser v La Macchia8 
had expressed the view that state jurisdiction 
effectively ended at the low water mark, and that all 
waters (save state internal waters) were within the 
Commonwealth’s sphere of control.9 With the 
installation in late 1972 of the Whitlam Government 
in Canberra, with its centralist platform, 
confrontation on control of Australia’s offshore 
areas seemed inevitable.10
Conflict did take place with the passing of the Seas 
and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth). This vested 
all of the territorial sea, save internal waters of the 
states such that existed immediately prior to 
Federation, in the Commonwealth.11 The Act also 
sought to give effect to the provisions of the 1958 
Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Conventions, 
and provided for the making of Proclamations for 
territorial sea baselines, the breadth of the territorial 
sea, the closing of historic bays, the limits of the 
continental shelf and the making of the limits of 
both territorial sea and the continental shelf charts. 
                                                     
                                                     
6 The proposition that the Commonwealth would have no 
power over the territorial sea is evident from the 
Constitutional Convention debates over the precursor to s 
51(x) in 1898: see Debates of the Australasian Constitutional 
Convention, Vol V, (1898) 1855-1865 and 1872-1874. 
7 Ibid; O’Connell, above n 3, 225-226. 
8 (1969) 122 CLR 177. 
9 See the judgments of Barwick CJ: (1969) 122 CLR 177 at 
191; Windeyer J at 223; although both these judges also 
supported some state extra-territorial competence: Barwick 
CJ at 189 and Windeyer J at 224-226. 
10 It is certainly arguable that confrontation would have 
occurred even if the Coalition had retained government in 
1972. A Bill had been introduced in 1970 which purported to 
vest all of the territorial sea in the Commonwealth Crown. In 
May 1972, Tasmania had already commenced an action 
before the Privy Council to explore Australia’s offshore 
arrangements, six months before the Whitlam Government 
was elected: see Richard Cullen, Federalism in Action: The 
Australian and Canadian Offshore Disputes (1990) 75-76. 
11 Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) s 6. The exception 
of waters within state limits at Federation is found in s 14 of 
the Act. Note: the present content of the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act 1973 is substantially different from its content in 
1973. 
The states responded by referring the legislation to 
the High Court, leading to the New South Wales v 
Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands 
Case).12 The Court determined that the 
Commonwealth’s position was in fact correct, and 
that it was responsible for all waters and seabed 
beyond the low water mark.13
The core of the analysis of the High Court was the 
discussion of the limits of the Australian colonies 
immediately prior to Federation. The majority 
judges, Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Mason, Jacobs and 
Murphy JJ, were of the view that the colonies’ 
sovereignty ended at the low water mark, and each 
of these judgments relied on R v Keyn to 
substantiate that conclusion. Their judgments also 
indicated, although for a variety of reasons,14 that 
the Commonwealth Parliament had the power to 
legislate with respect to these offshore areas, and 
had sovereignty over them, consistent with 
international law. Thus the Commonwealth had the 
power to deal with all maritime areas that were not 
part of a state, and according to the court, all waters, 
save certain internal waters. fell into this category. 
The decision in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case 
caused much disquiet among the states, and a 
change of government in Canberra saw the 
Commonwealth and state governments commence 
negotiations on jurisdiction in offshore areas. In 
1979, the negotiations concluded in the Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement (OCS).15
12 (1975) 135 CLR 337. 
13 For detailed discussions of the case, see Cullen, above n 10, 
86-90; see also D Lumb, The Law of the Sea and Australian 
Offshore Areas (1978) 69-76. 
14 The external affairs power, s 51(xxix) of the Constitution, 
was used by the judges to justify this conclusion, but in 
differing ways. Chief Justice Barwick and Mason J utilised 
the placitum saying that offshore areas were ‘geographically 
external’ and so within the ambit of the power: per Barwick 
CJ at 360 and Mason J at 471 (This view of s 51(xxix) was 
confirmed by the High Court in R v Polyukovich (1991) 172 
CLR 501 and in XYZ v Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 532). 
Justice Jacobs appeared to take the same view, although he 
did so in the context of a discussion of the 1958 Territorial 
Sea Convention: per Jacobs J at 497. Barwick CJ, McTiernan, 
Mason and Murphy JJ also indicated the Act was the 
implementation of various international agreements, namely 
the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and the 1958 Continental 
Shelf Convention: per Barwick CJ at 365-6; McTiernan J at 
377-82; Mason J at 470; and Murphy J at 502-3. 
15 For more detailed discussions of the OCS see Marcus 
Haward, ‘The Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement’ 
(1989) 13 Marine Policy 334; Cullen, above n 10, 104-129; 
Michael Crommelin, ‘Offshore Mining and Petroleum: 
Constitutional Issues’ (1981) 3 Australian Mining and 
Petroleum Law Journal 191; Brian R Opeskin and Donald R 
Rothwell, ‘Australia’s Territorial Sea: International and 
Federal Implications of Its Extension to 12 Miles’ (1991) 22 
Ocean Development and International Law 395, 408-410; 
38 
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The OCS proceeded from the High Court and the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Act position that 
sovereignty over all offshore areas (aside from those 
that were part of a state at Federation) was vested in 
the Commonwealth. However, the OCS surrendered 
to the states jurisdiction over the sea and seabed 
within three miles of the baselines of the territorial 
sea. This allowed the states to maintain the 
traditional control they had enjoyed over the 
territorial sea prior to the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act, without the necessity of altering state 
boundaries. 
The OCS was achieved by means of conjoint state 
and Commonwealth legislation, and came into effect 
in 1983.16 Any nagging doubts over the validity of 
the OCS or its enacting legislation were finally put 
to rest in 1989 in Port MacDonnell Professional 
Fishermens’ Association v South Australia.17 There, 
the High Court confirmed the valid application of 
state fisheries legislation to a large offshore area, 
based on a Commonwealth-state agreement over 
jurisdiction based on the OCS. The High Court took 
the opportunity to expressly indicate the OCS’s 
legislative framework was a valid exercise of power 
under section 51(xxxviii) of the Constitution.18
It would be a mistake to believe that the OCS had 
the effect of ‘freezing’ Australia into a three mile 
territorial sea for all time. The OCS did permit the 
extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles, to make 
Australian practice consistent with what even in 
1979 was perceived to be the acceptable inter-
national standard. However, the extension envisaged 
was not one of state jurisdiction to 12 miles, but 
rather of Commonwealth jurisdiction. The states 
would retain jurisdictional control over a three mile 
belt of territorial sea, while the Commonwealth 
would have jurisdiction and sovereignty over a nine 
mile belt of territorial sea completely enclosing the 
state waters. 
Although anticipated in 1979, the Proclamation 
extending the territorial sea to 12 miles was not 
                                                                                      
                                                     
Richard Cullen, ‘Canada and Australia: A Federal Parting of 
the Ways’ (1989) 18 Federal Law Review 53, 75-77; see also 
the discussions in the Australian Law Journal: (1979) 53 ALJ 
605; (1976) 50 ALJ 206; (1980) 54 ALJ 517. 
16 The Commonwealth, on the request of the states, enacted the 
Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980 (Cth) and the Coastal 
Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth). 
17 (1989) 168 CLR 340. 
18 See the discussions in Cullen, above n 10, 114-118; see also 
Richard Cullen, ‘Case Note: Port MacDonnell PFA Inc v 
South Australia’ (1990) 16 Monash University Law Review 
128. 
made until 1990.19 At international law, the 
extension did not have a significant impact on other 
States. No State except Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
had territory that lay within 24 miles of any 
Australian territory. Arrangements under the Torres 
Strait Treaty20 completely delimited territorial seas 
of the Australian islands that could affect the PNG 
territorial sea. 
Common law extent of the Australian states 
As noted above, R v Keyn and the doctrine of 
colonial extraterritorial incompetence combined to 
limit the ability of the Australian states to extend 
their jurisdiction seawards.21 The former limited 
their jurisdiction to the low water mark,22 and the 
latter prevented them from legislating their 
boundaries out to sea. However, the common law, 
and the constitutive instruments of at least one of the 
colonies, did provide some scope for gaining control 
over the waters of various bays, historic and 
otherwise. 
The common law rule in R v Keyn applied to the 
waters around Britain generally, and by analogy to 
the waters off British possessions around the 
world,23 although it could be abrogated by statute.24 
However, a different line of cases dealt with more 
specific situations. As early as 1308 in England, 
there was recognised that those with authority 
within a county, such as a coroner, could extend that 
authority to an arm of the sea extending inland, 
where the opposite shore was visible.25 While the 
test of using visibility (sometimes called ‘land-
kenning’ or ‘headland theory’26) to determine which 
19 Commonwealth of Australia, Gazette, No S297, 13 
November 1990 (with effect from 20 November 1990). 
20 Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua 
New Guinea concerning Sovereignty and Maritime 
Boundaries in the area between the two Countries, including 
the area known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters, [1985] 
Australian Treaty Series 4. 
21 William R Edeson, ‘Australian Bays’ (1968-69) 5 Australian 
Yearbook of International Law 10; O’Connell, above n 3, 
201-202. 
22 Certainly this was the view of the Law Officers in the 
opinions they provided to the Colonial Office on the ability of 
the colonies to legislate: See D P O’Connell and Ann 
Riordan, Opinions on Imperial Constitutional Law (1971) 
128-139. 
23 This was certainly the view of Barwick CJ and Windeyer J in 
Bonser v La Macchia (1969) 122 CLR 177; and of Windeyer 
J in Ferguson v Union Steamship Company of New Zealand 
(1968) 42 ALJR 33, 36-37: see Edeson, above n 21, 19; see 
also O’Connell,  above n 3, 211-217. 
24 As was the case following R v Keyn with the passing of the 
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1873 (Imp). 
25 O’Connell, above n 3, 234; Edeson, above n 21, 19-20. 
26 C John Colombos, The International Law of the Sea (1967) 
182; Edeson, above n 21, 19. 
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waters could be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
land was later criticised, the basic principle was 
sustained, and applied in a number of cases.27 Most 
of these related to rejection of Admiralty jurisdiction 
in rivers or ports, but some dealt with waters in quite 
large bays, and so are worthy of consideration in the 
current situation. 
The most famous of these cases was the Conception 
Bay Case.28 It involved consideration of whether the 
Government of Newfoundland could grant an 
exclusive right to lease the floor of Conception Bay 
to a submarine cable operator. The Bay’s mouth was 
some 20 miles wide, so in the nineteenth century 
could not be validly closed using the then existing 
closing line rules. A competitor subsequently laid its 
cable on the seabed of the Bay, and the question 
before the Privy Council was whether the floor of 
the Bay was part of the colony of Newfoundland, 
permitting the government of the colony to grant 
exclusive rights to its use. 
The Privy Council was unanimous in the view that 
the waters of Conception Bay were Newfoundland 
territory, and accordingly the Newfoundland 
Legislature could grant an exclusive right to use the 
seabed of the Bay to any individual. The Court 
reached this conclusion without having to consider 
whether there were any specific rules applicable to 
the closing of bays.29 However, in the course of his 
judgment, Lord Blackburn (for their Lordships) 
stated: 
It seems to them [their Lordships] that, in point of 
fact, the British Government has for a long period 
exercised dominion over this bay, and that their 
claim has been acquiesced by other nations, so as 
to shew that the bay has for a long time been 
occupied exclusively by Great Britain, a 
circumstance which in the tribunals of any 
country would be very important.30
This is very reminiscent of what was later to become 
the doctrine of historic bays, in that British 
sovereignty over the bay was established by the 
exercise of sovereignty (‘dominion’ in the words of 
their Lordships) over a long period of time, with the 
acquiescence of other States. 
                                                     
                                                     
27 A selection of the more significant cases are discussed 
immediately below; also see Edeson, above n 21, 19-23; 
Colombos, above n 26, 182-183. 
28 Direct United States Cable Company v The Anglo-American 
Cable Company [1877] 2 AC 394; for discussions of the case 
see Mitchell P Strohl, The International Law of Bays (1963) 
278-280; Colombos, above n 26, 184-185. 
29 [1877] 2 AC 394, 419-420. 
30 [1877] 2 AC 394, 420. 
One case relied upon by the Privy Council in the 
Conception Bay Case was R v Cunningham, Brown 
& Summers.31 There, the three defendants had been 
convicted of wounding a man on an American ship32 
anchored in the Penarth Roads in the Bristol 
Channel. They appealed on the basis that the 
convicting jury had been drawn from the county of 
Glamorgan, when it was unclear that the offence had 
taken place in Glamorgan at all. 
The Court quickly rejected this argument, and stated 
that they were of the view that the Bristol Channel 
was an ‘inland sea’ and that the waters closest to the 
littoral of any county facing onto the Channel were 
part of that county. In this instance, since the ship 
was closer to Glamorgan, that was where the 
offence had taken place. While the judgment’s 
analysis of why the Bristol Channel should 
constitute an inland sea is unfortunately sparse,33 it 
is clear that the Court regarded the waters of the 
Channel as British territory, although its mouth 
exceeded 100 nautical miles across.34
These cases are part of the common law of 
Australia,35 and are augmented by a brief reference 
in an Australian case, pertaining to the Gulf of St 
Vincent and Spencer Gulf. In R v Wilson,36 Stow J 
of the South Australian Supreme Court expressed 
the view that a murder committed on board HMS 
Sappho in the waters between Kangaroo Island and 
the mainland of South Australia was within South 
Australian jurisdiction. He also indicated that his 
31 (1859) 169 ER 1171; for additional discussion see Strohl, 
above n 28, 290-291; Edeson, above n 21, 21. 
32 Strohl notes that the offence occurred ‘when seagoing life 
could still be one of the more brutal of human experiences, 
and anti-social behaviour on board ships in port was 
annoyingly common’: Strohl, above n 28, 291. Neither at the 
appeal nor at first instance were similar sentiments expressed. 
33 The judgment of the Court was only 17 lines long, while the 
report of the case runs over seven pages, filled largely with 
the argument of counsel. 
34 It is worth noting that the width of the Bristol Channel in the 
vicinity of Penarth is less than 20 miles across. However, in a 
later case, The Fagernes [1926] P 185, Hill J held that the 
waters of the Channel at a point where it was over 20 miles 
wide were inter fauces terrae. This finding was later 
overturned on appeal by the Court of Appeal, largely due to 
the intervention of the Attorney-General, who indicated that 
the Minister for Home Affairs was of the view the place 
concerned was beyond ‘the territorial sovereignty of His 
Majesty’: [1927] P 311; see also Pleadings, Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case, Vol 1, 64-65; Vol 2, 491-494. 
35 Certainly they were discussed with approval by members of 
the High Court in Raptis v South Australia (1977) 15 ALR 
223 especially per Stephen J at 247-248; and by Windeyer J 
in Ferguson v Union Steamship Company of New Zealand 
(1968) 42 ALJR 33 at 36-37. 
36 Unreported, 1875. 
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view was in accord with the then Chief Justice of 
that court, Sir Richard Hanson.37
These early cases indicate that in spite of R v Keyn, 
the common law could accommodate the exercise of 
jurisdiction over bays, regardless of the size of those 
bays and the application of the closing line rules to 
them. However, not all bays were successfully 
deemed part of their respective colonies, states or 
territories. In Haruo Kitaoka v Commonwealth,38 
Wells J in the Supreme Court of the Northern 
Territory held that Boucaut Bay was not part of the 
Territory because it was not a bay at common law. 
In his discussion of the case, Edeson intimates that 
since Boucaut Bay did not conform to the definition 
of a juridical bay, it was not included.39
The application of the common law in respect of 
bays to post-Federation Australia, however, has 
raised other problems. Firstly, the constitutive 
instruments that brought the Australian colonies into 
juridical being also prescribed their limits, and 
accordingly, any bay which an Australian state 
could lay claim to must not be inconsistent with 
those instruments.40 An historic bay is, by definition, 
part of the State that claims it. If the instrument 
defining the boundaries of an Australian state 
precluded the inclusion of a particular bay, that state 
could not validly assert its sovereignty domestically 
over the bay, and so preclude the legislative action 
necessary to substantiate the claiming of the bay as 
historic.41
                                                     
                                                     
37 O’Connell, above n 3, 237-238. Interestingly, none of the 
majority of the High Court in Raptis v South Australia (see 
part 3(d) below) referred to R v Wilson in their judgments, 
even though it appears that the positions of the vessels in both 
cases were reasonably similar. Justice Mason chose not to 
make any use of the decision at all: (1977) 15 ALR 223, 251; 
see also D P O’Connell, ‘Problems of Australian Coastal 
Jurisdiction’ (1968) 42 Australian Law Journal 39, 43; 
Edeson, above n 21, 23; W R Edeson, ‘The Validity of 
Australia’s Possible Maritime Historic Claims in 
International Law’ (1974) 48 Australian Law Journal 299; 
Leo J Bouchez, The Regime of Bays in International Law 
(1964) 228. 
38 Unreported, 1937. 
39 A detailed study of this case can be found in W R Edeson, 
‘Foreign Fishermen in the Territorial Waters of the Northern 
Territory, 1937’ (1976) 7 Federal Law Review 202, 202-223; 
see also Edeson, above n 37, 303. 
40 However, this may not necessarily be so: South Australia v 
Victoria (State Boundaries Case) (1912) 12 CLR 667 (HC); 
(1914) 18 CLR 115; see generally Stuart B Kaye, ‘The Torres 
Strait Islands: Constitutional and Sovereignty Questions Post-
Mabo’ (1994) 18 University of Queensland Law Journal 38. 
41 Theoretically, the Commonwealth could assert that a bay was 
historic, and then legislate for it as a new and separate 
territory under s 122 of the Constitution. However, the High 
Court did not appear to approve of a similar suggestion for 
the continental shelf in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case 
(1975) 135 CLR 337, 389 (Gibbs J), 456 (Stephen J). 
Most of the original colonial Letters Patent or 
constitutive Acts deal only with land boundaries.42 If 
they refer to offshore areas at all, it is to confirm that 
the colony was to have jurisdiction over particular 
islands.43 In addition, some of the Letters Patent also 
have tended to be somewhat vague in 
circumscribing the extent of the colonies, causing 
problems that, in one instance, gave rise to 
international complications as recently as 1976.44 
The reasons for this are obvious when one considers 
the time at which these documents were prepared, 
the lack of first-hand experience their drafters had of 
Australia, poor access to satisfactory charts, and the 
general remoteness of Australia to London.45
The position of South Australia and the Northern 
Territory is different.46 The Letters Patent that 
created the Province of South Australia expressly 
included all ‘bays and gulfs’ as well as Kangaroo 
42 The original Letters Patent of New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia do not refer to 
bays in stating the limits of the colonies, although Edeson 
notes that Cook’s taking possession of the east coast of 
Australia did make reference to bays: Edeson, above n 21, 
14-16; the obvious exceptions to this are South Australia and 
the Northern Territory, which are discussed below. The 
Australian Capital Territory was surrendered from New 
South Wales by an Act of that state’s Parliament and is 
unique in that it is the only landlocked political division in 
the Australian federal structure. The Jervis Bay Territory was 
also surrendered by New South Wales, but only to the high 
water mark, so no bays can exist within it. None of the 
instruments placing the various external territories under 
Australian jurisdiction refer to bays. The relevant instruments 
are found or reprinted at the following locations: NSW: 
Historical Records of Australia, Series 1, Vol 1, 1; Vic: 13 & 
14 Vic ch 59 s 1; Qld: Public Acts of Queensland, (Sydney: 
Law Book Company, 1936) Vol 2, 569; WA: 10 Geo IV 
ch.22, s 1; Tas: Historical Records of Australia, Series III, 
Vol 5, 1; Jervis Bay Territory: Schedule 1 Seat of 
Government Surrender Act 1909 (NSW). 
43 The Letters Patent confirming Kangaroo Island as part of 
South Australia are reprinted in South Australian Statutes 
1837-1975 (1979) Vol 11, 749; Macquarie Island to 
Tasmania reprinted in Historical Records of Australia, Series 
III, Vol 5, p.1; Torres Strait Islands to Queensland reprinted 
in Queensland Statutes 1828-1936 (1937) Vol 2, 538. 
44 The scope and interpretation of the Letters Patent 
incorporating certain islands in Torres Strait to Queensland 
last century were creative of difficulties in the negotiation of 
the maritime boundary between Australia and Papua New 
Guinea: See generally Kaye, above n 40. 
45 However, it would be incorrect to say that not referring to 
bays in such instruments necessarily reflected Imperial 
practice. Edeson notes that in instruments pertaining to Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick and Quebec, there were references to 
bays: Edeson, above n 21, 17. 
46 See Seas and Submerged Lands Case (1975) 135 CLR 337; 
Also Edeson, above n 21, 15-17; see M H McLelland, 
‘Colonial and State Boundaries in Australia’ (1971) 45 
Australian Law Journal 671, 677. 
41 
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and other islands offshore.47 The reference to gulfs 
and bays was continued when the Northern Territory 
was added to South Australia in 1863.48 When South 
Australia surrendered the Northern Territory to the 
Commonwealth in 1910 bays and gulfs were again 
specifically mentioned.49
The importance of these instruments is enhanced 
when one considers the position of the states with 
regard to their offshore areas. By virtue of the Seas 
and Submerged Lands Case, it is clear that the states 
themselves did not extend beyond the low water 
mark of their coastlines. In some limited circum-
stances, they could extend jurisdiction out to 
offshore areas,50 but they could not assert their 
sovereignty over territorial waters. While this 
position has been modified by the OCS, at common 
law it remains unaltered. As much was confirmed by 
the Federal Court in Yarmirr, with Olney J at first 
instance.51
The exception to the common law in this area is 
internal waters. If a state can establish that a 
particular bay, inlet or gulf is part of its internal 
waters, then it can assert its sovereignty over those 
waters, and could have done so in 1975 in spite of 
the Seas and Submerged Lands Case. The relevance 
of the Colonial Letters Patent is that they make it 
significantly easier for South Australia, as against 
the other states, to establish that the waters of a 
particular bay are internal waters, be they historic or 
otherwise The 1836 Letters Patent create a 
presumption in favour of South Australia that the 
waters of any bay on the mainland are internal 
waters.52
For the other five states, the presumption is reversed 
and they must establish that they ought to assert 
their sovereignty over particular waters.53 While not 
                                                     
                                                     
47 South Australian Statutes 1837-1975 (1979) Vol 8, 830; This 
was authorised by 4 & 5 Will IV ch 95 s 1. 
48 Northern Territory Act 1863 (SA) preamble. 
49 Northern Territory Surrender Act 1907 (SA) s 5; Northern 
Territory Acceptance Act 1910 (Cth) s 4. 
50 See, eg, Robinson v Western Australian Museum (1977) 138 
CLR 283. 
51 See below. 
52 The reference to gulfs and bays has been held to only apply to 
the South Australia mainland, and not to any bays on 
Kangaroo Island, or any other islands within the state: Raptis 
v South Australia (1977) 15 ALR 223. 
53 O’Connell makes the point that it may not be clear on what 
basis the South Australian Gulfs could be claimed as historic 
bays: that is, whether they are based on principles of 
international law or domestic legal considerations. He 
suggests that it is probably a combination of both, with the 
domestic legislation providing the historic justification for the 
claim: D P O’Connell, ‘Bays, Historic Waters and the 
Implications of A. Raptis & Son v South Australia’ (1978) 52 
Australian Law Journal 64, 67. 
precluding these states from claiming jurisdiction 
over bays,54 the lack of specific reference to a grant 
of jurisdiction make it more difficult for them to 
assert the existence of an historic bay,55 for the 
purposes of Australian domestic law. 
In more recent times, the High Court has been 
compelled to wrestle with the question of juris-
diction over large bays. The jurisdictional issue 
involved lends itself to comparison more with the 
American cases considered earlier than the previous 
English authorities, if only because the cases here 
involved disputes over state and/or Federal juris-
diction over particular waters. 
In Ferguson v Union Steamship Company of New 
Zealand,56 Sir Victor Windeyer briefly considered 
whether the waters of Emu Bay near the town of 
Burnie in Tasmania were part of that state. After 
considering the old notion of land-kenning to 
enclose a bay, his Honour noted that the old test was 
‘more interesting than helpful today’. Unfortunately, 
Windeyer J chose not to indicate what he believed 
the contemporary test to be, and merely concluded 
that Emu Bay in toto was not part of Tasmania, 
although the wharves and port facilities were part of 
Tasmania. 
Of most relevance to the discussion at hand is the 
High Court’s decision in A Raptis & Son v South 
Australia.57 In that case, the Court had to determine 
whether the waters of the two South Australian 
Gulfs were internal waters of that state, and if so 
whether these internal waters included the waters of 
the Investigator Strait between the Gulfs proper and 
Kangaroo Island. Clearly the waters of the Gulfs 
could not qualify for closure even under the most 
generous 24 mile closing rules for juridical bays, so 
the High Court’s determination was in effect an 
assessment of whether the Gulfs of St Vincent and 
Spencer were historic bays, and if so how far did 
they extend.58
Not all the judges chose to consider the question in 
terms of historic bays. Of the four majority judges, 
54 This is ‘bays’ in the generic rather than juridical sense of the 
word. 
55 It was the view of Stephen J in Raptis v South Australia that 
without Letters Patent expressly including ‘bays and gulfs’ as 
within the colony, the two South Australian gulfs would not 
have been validly incorporated into that state. This is 
suggestive that it may be very difficult, if not impossible: 
(1977) 15 ALR 223, 243; it also appears to reflect the 
position of Edeson: Edeson, above n 21, 25-26. 
56 (1968) 42 ALJR 33. 
57 (1977) 15 ALR 223. 
58 A most useful geographical analysis of the decision has been 
provided by Prescott: J R V Prescott, Australia’s Maritime 
Boundaries (1985) 53-56. 
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neither Barwick CJ nor Jacobs J referred to the term 
‘historic bay’ or to any of the American or British 
bay cases or the UN Secretariat Studies.59 Their 
reasoning focused very much upon the South 
Australia Letters Patent, and interpreted them to 
mean that the Gulfs ought to be closed separately, 
without incorporating the Investigator Strait into 
South Australia’s internal waters. 
Justices Gibbs and Stephen did look at a wider range 
of material, but reached the same conclusion. Justice 
Gibbs concluded that while the Conception Bay 
Case permitted a wide expanse of water like the 
Gulf of St Vincent to be enclosed,60 the Backstairs 
Passage was too significant a feature and Kangaroo 
Island was too large to permit the Island to be 
treated as just an extension of the mainland.61 
Justice Stephen, after reviewing some of the British 
authority considered above,62 placed the whole 
question of determining what was an historic bay in 
the ‘too hard basket’. His Honour stated: 
The geographical aspects of the particular feature 
would require to be adequately understood and 
the relevant aspects of history and usage would 
have to be examined...But to undertake such a 
task, as it were, at large and for an entire 
coastline, and this in the absence of appropriate 
detailed evidence, is a course upon which this 
court should not, in my view, embark.63
Neither of these two judges really seriously 
addressed the international law ramifications of their 
decisions, although perhaps there are vague echoes 
of the historic bay tests in Stephen J’s judgment. As 
Professor O’Connell has observed, essentially all of 
the majority engaged in an exercise of statutory 
interpretation.64
The minority in Raptis’ Case looked a little further 
afield for material in making their decisions, but 
essentially differed with the majority on the factual 
question of the extent of the two Gulfs. Justice 
Mason reviewed both English and American 
authority, and specifically referred to ‘historical 
                                                     
                                                     
59 In fairness to Barwick CJ, in the course of his judgment, he 
did indicate some approval of the reasoning of Stephen J, 
who had considered some of the above material. 
60 (1977) 15 ALR 223, 234-237. 
61 (1977) 15 ALR 223, 237-238; his Honour also made 
reference to Louisiana v United States 394 US 11 (1968) and 
chose to distinguish that case’s treatment of offshore islands 
on the basis that Kangaroo Island was far larger, and 
separated by more substantial and deeper waters. 
62 (1977) 15 ALR 223, 243-249; his Honour also reviewed 
Windeyer J’s judgment in Ferguson v Union Steamship 
Company of New Zealand (1968) 42 ALJR 33. 
63 (1977) 15 ALR 223, 249. 
64 O’Connell, above n 53, 65. 
bays’,65 while Murphy J went even further, citing 
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and the 1962 
Study to support his position.66
In terms of an addition to the law of historic bays, 
Raptis v South Australia is disappointing. For the 
most part, the judges, perhaps with the exception of 
Murphy J and to a lesser extent Mason J, examined 
the question of the status of the two Gulfs from very 
much a domestic point of view.67 Chief Justice 
Barwick and Jacobs J, for example, refer to no cases 
apart from those of Australian origin. The Court 
made no real attempt to analyse international law for 
principles, but appeared to prefer construing the 
Letters Patent setting up South Australia. This 
contrasts markedly from the approach of the US 
Supreme Court, which actively sought to apply 
international law in determining what the boundaries 
of the states before it were. In fairness to the High 
Court, they were not presented with evidence of any 
exclusion of foreign State nationals or acquiescence 
by other States that would be necessary in 
determining the existence of an historic bay at 
international law.68  
In addition to Raptis’ Case, there have also been two 
unreported fisheries cases dealing with the status of 
Anxious Bay. In Evans v Milton69 and Glover v 
Paul,70 South Australian Magistrates held that, 
based on the 1836 Letters Patent and Raptis’ Case, 
the waters of Anxious Bay were internal to South 
Australia.71 In both decisions, they indicated the 
points used to close the bay, and these were subse-
quently fixed upon by the Joint Commonwealth/ 
South Australia Committee in 1987 as appropriate to 
close the bay. Neither of the decisions was reported, 
so it is not possible to say whether the vessels 
involved were Australian or foreign, or whether the 
magistrates involved made reference to international 
law. 
The significance of the common law and the limits 
of the States is that the OCS did not alter the limits 
of the states – it merely gave them legislative 
authority to make laws with respect to waters to a 
distance of three nautical miles from the territorial 
65 (1977) 15 ALR 223, 254. 
66 (1977) 15 ALR 223, 263. 
67 O’Connell noted that if questions of international law were 
raised in the judgments, ‘they were touched upon’ but 
solutions were not developed to the questions: O’Connell, 
above n 53, 65. 
68 Ibid 68. 
69 Unreported, 1981. 
70 Unreported, 1984. 
71 Commonwealth/South Australian Committee, South 
Australian Historic Bays Issue, (1986) 25; Prescott, above n 
58, 70. 
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sea baselines. The OCS legislation also gave title to 
the seabed in this three nautical mile belt, but again 
this did not change the limits of the states. 
This means that in the context of exercising powers 
at common law, the states are restricted to their old 
common law limits rather than being empowered 
under the OCS, although they can make laws and 
enforce them to a distance of three nautical miles 
within the territorial sea, and potentially further if a 
nexus between the activity being regulated and the 
state. This is significant because it means that any 
exercise of the executive power of a state, or the 
application of the common law offshore, will be 
limited to the common law limits of the state. This 
position was applied by the High Court and the 
Federal Court in Commonwealth v Yarmirr72 in the 
context of the common law basis of native title 
rights offshore, and is confirmed in the context of 
executive power by the High Court in Joseph v 
Colonial Treasurer (NSW).73 In the latter case, the 
High Court held that a state cannot determine the 
exercise of the war prerogative, and that aspect of 
executive power rested with the Commonwealth. 
This would appear to limit a state’s ability to act 
independently in the context of security issues, 
although it may not prevent the Commonwealth 
from acting with a state in the exercise of executive 
power.  
The complexities of the application of the common 
law in offshore areas were demonstrated in Yarmirr. 
At first instance, Olney J undertook an examination 
of the territorial limits of the Northern Territory. 
This analysis relied heavily upon the High Court’s 
judgment in Raptis & Son v South Australia.74 
Interestingly, Raptis itself, and all the other cases his 
Honour made use of in this context,75 predated the 
proclamation of territorial sea baselines.76 The 
territorial sea is measured from baselines, pro-
claimed by the Governor-General with effect from 
                                                                                                          
72 Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1. 
73 (1918) 25 CLR 32. 
74 (1977) 138 CLR 346. 
75 The Fagernes [1927] P 311; Direct United States Cable 
Company v Anglo-American Cable Company [1877] 2 AC 
394; Adams v Bay of Islands County [1916] NZLR 65; 
Ferguson v Union Steamship Company of New Zealand Ltd 
(1968) 119 CLR 191. Interestingly, Olney J made no 
reference to Haruo Kitaoka v Commonwealth, Unreported, 
Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, Wells J, No 14 of 
1937) which considered whether Boucaut Bay was within the 
limits of the Northern Territory. This omission was rectified 
by the Full Federal Court upon appeal: Commonwealth v 
Yarmirr (1999) 168 ALR 426, 456–7 (Beaumont and von 
Doussa JJ). 
76 Yarmirr v Northern Territory (1998) 156 ALR 370, 389–95. 
14 February 1983, and updated in 2002.77 For the 
purposes of international law, and those of the OCS, 
the waters on the landward side of the baselines are 
internal waters. However, Olney J’s discussion 
implicitly assumes that the common law offshore 
limits of the Northern Territory are still determined 
solely by application of the Letters Patent 
establishing the Province of South Australia.78
Such an approach appears to be necessary on two 
grounds. Firstly, if the common law did not permit 
the existence of native title beyond the limits of the 
Territory, all native title rights beyond those limits 
would have been extinguished on its establish-
ment.79 Secondly, section 7 of the Coastal Waters 
(Northern Territory Title) Act 1980 (Cth) states that 
nothing in that Act is deemed to alter the limits of 
the Northern Territory. It could also be assumed that 
the proclamation of baselines under section 7 of the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) did not 
alter the limits of the Territory, as to admit that 
possibility would have meant that similar baselines 
proclaimed for the States would be invalid by virtue 
of conflicting with section 123 of the Constitution.80 
The essential validity of Olney J’s approach was 
confirmed on appeal. Justices Beaumont and von 
Doussa recognised that the application of the Act to 
offshore areas was problematic.81 The majority 
ultimately adopted the view of Olney J that the Act 
did apply, and that it was unnecessary to determine 
the precise limits of the Northern Territory.82 They 
also undertook an exhaustive examination of the 
limits of the Northern Territory and, while providing 
more detail than Olney J, were in general agreement 
with his conclusions.83
The majority of the High Court on appeal sought to 
restrict R v Keyn to matters involving criminal 
jurisdiction, and to indicate the common law could 
be extended offshore. Chief Justice Gleeson and 
Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated: 
77 See discussion below. 
78 Province of South Australia, ‘Letters Patent under the Great 
Seal of the United Kingdom erecting and establishing the 
Province of South Australia and fixing the boundaries 
thereof’, Government Gazette, Proclamation No SRSA: GRG 
2/64, 19 February 1836. 
79 If this is so, then his Honour should have considered the 
Letters Patent establishing New South Wales, out of which 
South Australia was subsequently established by its own 
Letters Patent. 
80 See Coastal Waters (States Title) Act 1983 (Cth). 
81 This is because the date of acquisition of sovereignty over sea 
areas followed R v Keyn (1876) 2 Ex D 63. 
82 Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 168 ALR 426, 439–45 
(Beaumont and von Doussa JJ). 
83 Ibid 448-71. 
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The Commonwealth contention that the common 
law does not apply beyond the low-water mark 
sometimes appeared, in the course of argument, 
to go so far as contending that the courts could 
give no remedies in respect of transactions or 
events which occurred in that area. Keyn does not 
warrant such a general or absolute proposition. 
Keyn established that, absent statutory authority, 
a criminal court cannot punish as criminal, 
conduct which happens beyond the low-water 
mark on vessels flying the flag of a foreign state. 
The same proposition, with respect to the 
Colonial Courts of Admiralty, previously had 
been established in New Zealand by R v Dodd. 
That conclusion owed much to the history of the 
criminal law and trial by jury and is a conclusion 
about the reach of the criminal law. As it 
happens, legislative action to reverse the effect of 
the decision in Keyn was soon taken but this may 
be put aside as irrelevant to the Commonwealth’s 
contention about the common law.84
The majority declined to explore what title the 
Northern Territory had acquired as a result of the 
OCS, only noting that the implementation of the 
OCS had not extinguished extant native title.85 In 
noting the changes to the extent of the territorial sea 
since British settlement, the majority viewed the 
approach taken by Olney J at first instance with 
approval.86
This raises an issue in the context of offshore 
jurisdiction to deal with maritime interception of 
vessels. This is because the criminal jurisdiction of 
the states will be in issue, potentially leaving R v 
Keyn in place, and still rendering the old limits of 
the states of importance.  
State jurisdiction under Commonwealth statute  
On 4 February 1983, a Proclamation was made 
under the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 
(Cth), setting down new baselines, this time for the 
whole continent, Tasmania, and a number of 
offshore islands.87 An earlier set of baselines for 
southern New South Wales and Tasmania which had 
been made in 1974 were revoked with the 
establishment of the new baselines. 
Instead of proclaiming the baseline by representing 
it on a set of charts, the 1983 Proclamation 
nominated precise basepoints, rather than leave the 
                                                     
84 Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 43-44. 
85 Ibid 59. 
86 Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 60. 
87 Commonwealth Gazette, Proclamation No S29, 9 February 
1983, made 4 February 1983. 
interpretation of the location of such points to a 
diagrammatic representation. Basepoints are 
described to the nearest second of latitude and 
longitude, and while each relates to a particular 
physical feature, no such features are referred to by 
name. The 1983 Proclamation also specified that 
where the coast itself was to provide the territorial 
sea baseline, it would be measured from the lowest 
astronomic tide.  
There are 396 baselines prescribed in the 1983 
Proclamation, and they are divided into three tables: 
those pertaining to the Australian mainland; those 
for Tasmania; and those for various groups of 
offshore islands separated from both the mainland 
and Tasmania. Notably though, the 1983 
Proclamation only establishes baselines along the 
coasts of the states or the Northern Territory. No 
specific baselines have been created for any of the 
external Territories.  
The 1983 Proclamation also differed from the 1974 
Proclamation by not exhaustively indicating all the 
baselines or precisely indicating exactly where the 
baseline of Australia’s territorial sea was to be 
found. The 1983 Proclamation does set down 
baselines, but it also indicates that these lines are by 
no means exhaustive. Rather, it adopts the formula 
for closing lines from Article 7 of the 1958 
Territorial Sea Convention, and directs the reader to 
determine for themselves whether a particular 
feature should be closed. As such, all bays and river 
mouths conforming to the definition in Article 7 are 
to have baselines drawn across them, but the precise 
location of these lines, and whether indeed a 
particular feature ought to generate such baselines is 
left uncertain. This allows the 1983 Proclamation to 
close features such as Sydney Harbour or Port 
Phillip Bay without the necessity of setting down 
coordinates to do so. 
The reasons why an exhaustive listing of basepoints 
was not embarked upon can be guessed at. The 
vastness of the Australian coastline would have 
made the job a most difficult and laborious one. By 
utilising the formula, this additional labour was 
rendered unnecessary. It also had the advantage of 
extending the ambit of the Proclamation to the 
external Territories as well, even though no specific 
baselines related to them. As such, Australia could 
contend that for over 10 years it has asserted its right 
to baselines across various features in the Australian 
Antarctic Territory without objection, whereas the 
proclamation of specific baselines would have been 
problematic, extremely laborious, and almost 
certainly inviting objection from those States which 
do not recognise Australia’s claim. 
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The 1983 Proclamation, in setting basepoints for 
various portions of the coast, also does not 
completely indicate the precise locale of the 
territorial sea baseline. The 1983 Proclamation also 
sets out a convoluted mechanism for the adjustment 
of lines between basepoints in the event that such a 
line crosses a feature that is above the low water 
mark. When the line between two specified base-
points encounters a feature above water at the lowest 
astronomic tide, the territorial sea baseline 
incorporates the feature, and then continues along its 
path. 
As noted above, the 1983 Proclamation was made 
under section 7 of the Seas and Submerged Lands 
Act 1973 (Cth). This section expressly draws its 
validity from the Law of the Sea Convention. 
Section II deals with the limits of the territorial sea, 
and permits the drawing of baselines in the 
following circumstances: 
1. where the coastline is ‘deeply indented or cut 
into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the 
coast in its immediate vicinity’, provided that 
such baselines do not, to an appreciable extent, 
depart from the general direction of the coast; 
2. where there is a bay, with a mouth no wider than 
24 miles across, that conforms to the semi-circle 
area test; or 
3. where there is a river mouth. 
On 19 March 1987, the then Governor-General of 
Australia, Sir Ninian Stephen, issued a Proclamation 
pursuant to section 8 of the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act 1973.88 Section 8 empowered the 
Governor-General to proclaim baselines to enclose 
the waters of certain bays as historic bays, and the 
Proclamation in this instance enclosed the waters of 
four bays in South Australia. 
After the compilation of technical and historical data 
concerning the various bays, a joint Commonwealth/ 
South Australian Committee recommended that four 
be proclaimed as historic bays: Encounter Bay, 
Lacepede Bay, Rivoli Bay and Anxious Bay. 
On 7 April 1991, the United States Embassy in 
Canberra lodged a formal protest to Australia over 
the proclamation of the four South Australian 
historic bays.89 While the protest was part of a series 
of American protests over historic bay claims, it did 
purport to consider evidence provided by the 
Australian Government, and to assess the bays 
against the three basic criteria. 
                                                     
                                                     
88 Commonwealth Gazette, Proclamation No S57, 31 March 
1987. 
89 See (1994) 15 Australian Yearbook of International Law 485. 
More recently, a rectangular set of baselines was 
proclaimed in the Gulf of Carpentaria in 2000, to 
enclose a roadstead off the port of Karumba.90 The 
enclosure of baselines around a roadstead is 
permitted under Article 12 of the Law of the Sea 
Convention. 
Subsequent developments  
In 2006, the Commonwealth moved to replace the 
1983 and 1987 baseline proclamations. A new 
proclamation was made to update the geodetic 
coordinates originally used, while essentially 
leaving the original intention of those baselines 
intact. The 2006 baselines apply to the Australian 
mainland, Tasmania and a number of smaller 
offshore islands.91
In addition to specifying straight baselines, the 
Proclamation also retains the formula of creating 
additional baselines in certain circumstances, in a 
fashion that draws heavily from the Law of the Sea 
Convention. Such baselines are deemed to exist 
where there are permanent harbourworks, the mouth 
of a river or certain types of bay. Any bays closed in 
this fashion must be less than 24 nautical miles wide 
at the entrance, with allowance for islands in the bay 
mouth, and have an area of water greater than the 
area of a semi-circle using the width of the mouth of 
the bay as its diameter.92 In addition, the historic bay 
baselines were revoked and replaced with updated 
baselines in the same fashion as the wider baseline 
system in 2006. 
More expansive baselines could conceivably be 
proclaimed in the future, for example, to enclose 
much of the Great Barrier Reef as a fringing reef. 
However, it is submitted that a baseline to enclose 
the Gulf of Carpentaria is unlikely and probably 
impossible. In 1968, the then Attorney-General, Mr 
Bowen, in response to an Opposition motion that 
Australia exert exclusive jurisdiction over the waters 
of the Gulf, stated: 
I would simply say that because of the width and 
configuration of the Gulf of Carpentaria, it is a 
type of bay which normally under international 
law, has been accepted as unclaimable... 
Unfortunately we cannot make this [exclusive 
90 Seas and Submerged Lands Act Proclamation 2000 (Cth), 29 
August 2000. 
91 Seas and Submerged Lands (Territorial Sea Baseline) 
Proclamation 2006 (Cth), 15 February 2006. 
92 This requirement is drawn directly from art 10 of the Law of 
the Sea Convention: United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). 
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Figure 1. Adjacent areas under the Crimes at Sea Act 2000 (Cth) 
jurisdiction] claim to the Gulf of Carpentaria.  In 
the past we have not acted in such a way as to be 
able to claim we have excluded people from the 
area and made it an historic bay.93  
This is suggestive that Australia accepted the 
requirement of an assertion of jurisdiction over the 
area of the historic bay for some period of time, and 
that no such assertion in the past for the Gulf of 
Carpentaria precluded its claim as an historic bay.94 
This is to say nothing of the likely international 
protest that would certainly accompany any 
Australian historic waters claim to the Gulf. 
                                                     
                                                     
93 Commonwealth of Australia, Hansard HR Debates, Vol 59, 
1795. 
94 Strohl, in 1963, also considered the status of the Gulf of 
Carpentaria: see Strohl, above n 28, 64; see also Edeson, 
above n 37, 302. 
By application of the OCS, the states would have 
jurisdiction over waters landward of the territorial 
sea baselines, and seawards to a distance of three 
nautical miles. This would seem clear in the 
application of state legislation, although for the 
reasons indicated not necessarily state executive 
power or common law. 
Crimes at sea legislation 
State criminal jurisdiction offshore is also affected 
by the Crimes at Sea Act 2000 (Cth). Under the 
scheme agreed by the Commonwealth and states, 
state criminal law would operate aboard Australian 
flagged and certain other vessels depending on their 
location.95 Each location for jurisdiction was 
determined by the adjacent areas used in the 
95 Crimes at Sea Act 2001 (Cth) s 6. 
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Offshore Petroleum Settlement.96 These areas are 
vast and extend well beyond the Australian 
Exclusive Economic Zone, but they are not 
inconsistent with international law because they are 
not used as a basis for jurisdiction in themselves 
(see Figure 1). 
Figure 2. Complicated jurisdiction in South Australia 
The identification of state criminal law in adjacent 
offshore areas does not mean that the state must be 
the government with responsibility for enforcement, 
or that the state can prevent the Commonwealth 
from acting. The Crimes at Sea Act makes it very 
clear that within the territorial sea, to a distance of 
12 nautical miles, state law can operate by its own 
force,97 presumably representing what the Common-
wealth and the states viewed as a sufficient physical 
nexus to satisfy the post-Australia Act nexus test. 
The Crimes at Sea Act indicates that while the 
criminal law of a state will apply in the adjacent 
areas in the legislative scheme, it only applies 
beyond 12 nautical miles by virtue of the force of 
Commonwealth law. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to see that 
enforcement by a state of its own criminal law on a 
ship in its adjacent area beyond the territorial sea 
could be ultra vires. Indeed, the Crimes at Sea Act 
explicitly notes that enforcement by state and 
Commonwealth agencies is possible, since Schedule 
1 clause 2 provides that where an arrest is effected 
by state personnel, state laws of evidence and 
procedure apply, while where the arrest is effected 
by Commonwealth officers, the rules of evidence 
and procedure are federal. On the other hand, the 
explicit reference to state law being applicable by 
force of Commonwealth law may have the effect of 
severing the nexus with the state, placing a question 
over state enforcement, at least independent of 
Commonwealth collaboration, beyond 12 nautical 
miles. 
Conclusion 
The jurisdiction of the Australian states offshore is 
far from simple. Most confusing, and not generally 
understood, is that the common law extent of the 
states is not the same as the waters under their juris–
diction within the territorial sea baselines. In most 
cases, this difference will favour the proclaimed 
baselines, as is most graphically demonstrated in the 
area in the vicinity of Kangaroo Island off the South 
Australian coast. As discussed above, in Raptis’ 
Case, the High Court held that the waters of the 
Investigator Strait between Kangaroo Island and 
                                                     
96 See Cullen, above n 10, 65-70 
97 Crimes at Sea Act 2001 (Cth) sch 1, cl 2(2).  
South Australia, including the narrow Backstairs 
Passage, were not part of South Australia, although 
the waters of the two great South Australian gulfs, 
Spencer and St Vincent, were part of South 
Australia at common law. On the other hand, the 
Commonwealth’s territorial sea baseline procla-
mations enclose the waters between Kangaroo 
Island and the mainland as internal waters. This 
creates a substantial band of waters which are under 
the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) 
internal waters, under South Australian jurisdiction, 
which are beyond the limits of the state at common 
law. The complexity is evident in Figure 2. 
Such a disjuncture of jurisdiction is not limited to 
South Australia, although the illustration is certainly 
the largest example. It is also an example that is 
relatively clear, as the courts have rarely considered 
the status of waters around the Australian coast. 
Other areas around the country have generally not 
seen the courts determine the extent of the states at 
common law. With increasing claims to native title 
offshore, based on legislation relying on the 
common law, as well as increasing activity and 
regulation around the Australian coast, greater 
clarity as to the limits of the Australian states’ 
jurisdiction would be desirable.  
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